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Climate Change and Security
Francesco Sindico*
Ten years ago, in the very first issue of Carbon and
Climate Law Review (CCLR), I discussed the ques-
tion of whether climate change was becoming a se-
curity issue andwhether it belongedwithin the scope
of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).1 The
first issue of CCLR was published on the backdrop
of the first ever debate before the UNSC on the im-
pacts of climate change on international security,
which took place on 17 April 2007, and just a few
years after the release in 2004 of the High-Level Pan-
el on Threats, Challenges and Change report that in-
cluded environmental degradation as a possible
threat to international security.2 In that article, I ar-
gued that three factors had led climate change before
the UNSC: the leadership of the United Kingdom in
this specific area of climate diplomacy, the changing
nature of security from international to human secu-
rity,3 and a greater emphasis on sustainable develop-
ment and conflict prevention. I then went on to dis-
cuss whether the UNSC was indeed the right place
to be discussing climate change. Countries were very
much divided at the time. On the one hand, several
developed countries and small-island developing
states (SIDS) were in favour of giving the UNSC a
role in dealing with climate change, but even there
one could appreciate differences. Developed coun-
tries saw the ‘securitisation’ of climate change as a
way to raise the stakes and increase global awareness.
SIDS pursued a much more active role of the UNSC,
maintaining that climate change was already a secu-
rity issue for them. On the other hand, most devel-
oping countries did not see favourably the involve-
ment of the UNSC. They considered that climate
change should have been dealt with more global in-
stitutions, such as the UN General Assembly and the
international climate change legal regime itself.
Ten years later, the celebration of CCLR’s anniver-
sary provides us with an opportunity to briefly dis-
cuss the extent to which climate change has indeed
become a security issue andwhether the UNSC itself
has taken a greater role. I will first review whether
climate change has indeed been further discussed be-
fore the UNSC, or has even been included in any of
its Resolutions. I will then move on to discuss
whether in thepast tenyears climate changehasbeen
linked to other factors that could lead to a threat to
peace and international security. Finally, I will high-
light some international legal questions (outside of
the UNSC) that stem from the securitisation of the
climate change discourse.
The discussion in 2007 at the UNSC on climate
change was not an isolated event. It was followed by
a meeting in 2011, two in 2015 and a further one in
April 2017. These meetings have followed the Arria
formula, meant to encourage more informal discus-
sions that do not necessarily lead to the adoption of
formal documents, hence giving countries more
space to voice their positions and concerns. Stem-
ming from such discussions the UN General Assem-
bly adopted in 2009 a Resolution on ‘Climate change
and its possible security implications’,4 which man-
dated the Secretary General to submit a report on the
topic of climate change and security,5whichwas pub-
lished later the same year.6 Rather than providing a
clear indication as to whether climate change is in-
deed to be considered a threat to peace and interna-
tional security, and far fromclarifying apotential role
for the UNSC, these meetings have, over the last
decade, provided space for soft power and climate
diplomacy to push climate change higher on the
UNSC agenda as a ‘threat multiplier’. And that is pre-
cisely what climate change is and should be consid-
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1 Francesco Sindico, ‘Climate Change: A Security (Council) Issue?’
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2 United Nations, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility
(Report of the Secretary General’s High-Level Panel on Threats,
Challenges and Change, 2004).
3 Michael R Redclift, David Manuel-Navarrete and Mark Pelling,
Climate Change and Human Security: The Challenge to Local
Governance under Rapid Coastal Urbanization (Edward Elgar
Publishing 2011).
4 UNGA Resolution 63/281, 3 June 2009.
5 ibid, para 2.
6 United Nations, Climate change and its possible security implica-
tions (Report of the Secretary General, Doc A/64/350, 11 Septem-
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ered. Climate change per se is no threat to peace and
international security, but its negative effects, when
coupled with other factors that lead to conflicts and
violence, canmake a situation, literally, explosive. An
exampleof this approach comes fromLakeChad.The
UNSC organised a visit to the region in March 2017,
which endedwith a statement byMr Rycroft, the UK
President of the UNSC at the time, who framed the
causes of tension and conflict in the region in the fol-
lowing way: ‘Those are multifaceted, complex set of
problems and require a holistic set of solutions.’
Amongst thesemultifaceted challenges ‘drought and
other environmental challenges’ were singled out.7
That same month, UNSC Resolution 2349 (2017) on
the Lake Chad refers to climate change in the follow-
ing terms:
Recognizes the adverse effects of climate change
and ecological changes among other factors on the
stability of the region, including through water
scarcity, drought, desertification, land degrada-
tion, and food insecurity, and emphasizes the need
for adequate risk assessments and risk manage-
ment strategies by governments and the United
Nations relating to these factors;8
Only 10 years after the first meeting discussing cli-
mate change before the UNSC, the latter has adopt-
ed a legally binding Resolution where it did not shy
away from mentioning climate change and its ad-
verse effects as one of the ‘roots causes’ of a conflict,
in this case the tension and violence in the Lake Chad
region. Interestingly, it does not limit itself to stating
that climate change is a threat multiplier, but it takes
a further step and encourages countries and the UN
to step up its efforts in terms of ‘risk assessment’ and
‘risk management’ strategies. I will show how this
last recommendation may well be a potential link
with the current international climate change legal
regime.
But before I get there, let us pause and reflect as
to whether the past ten years have proved that cli-
mate change is indeed a threat multiplier leading to
threats to peace and international security. One of
the major conflicts of the last ten years has been in-
creasingly linked to climate change. According to
some authors, the apparent sectarian and political
nature of the Syrian conflict also hides causes direct-
ly linked to climate change.9 In 2006, the worse
drought in centuries paved the way for unrest in al-
ready crowded cities. Water shortages and rise in
food prices increased tensions and led to violence
within the cities where the unrest and the civil war
started. Moving to the African continent, a UNEP re-
port links climate change to the violent conflict in
Darfur. Water scarcity and crops decline in produc-
tivity were hailed as many of the factors exacerbat-
ing the already existing tensions.10 Talking about the
Darfur conflict, formerUNSecretary General BanKi-
Moon referred to it in the following way: ‘Amid the
diverse social and political causes, the Darfur conflict
began as an ecological crisis, arising at least in part
from climate change.’11 And on the Arab peninsula,
water and climate change have been said to be at the
heart of the ongoing conflict in Yemen.12 Further
studieshavehighlighted the relationshipbetweenex-
tremeclimatic conditionsandunrest incountries and
regions, such as Afghanistan, Somalia and Northern
Africa. The same study concludes by maintaining
that ‘natural disasters had the potential to amplify al-
ready existing societal tensions and … thus to further
destabilise several of the world’s most conflict-prone
regions’.13 It would be difficult to argue that these
past and current conflicts are directly linked to cli-
mate change, but the past decade has proven that cli-
mate change and its negative effects, water scarcity
in particular, pose a considerable threat multiplier to
countries that are already prone to tension for other
non-environmental reasons.
This short piece has showed that in the last ten
years the UNSC has continued to address climate
change as a security issue and has recently even in-
cluded it in a Resolution as one of the root factors of
7 ‘Security Council wraps up Lake Chad Basin visit; stops in “epi-
centre” of Boko Haram violence’ (UN News Centre, 6 March
2017) <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=56298
#.WYi3FoTyvIW> accessed 17 August 2017.
8 UNSC Resolution 2349 (2017), para 26 <https://www.un.org/
press/en/2017/sc12773.doc.htm> accessed 17 August 2017.
9 Peter H Gleick, ‘Water, Drought, Climate Change, and Conflict in
Syria’ (2014) 6 AMS 331-340.
10 United Nations Environment Programme, ‘Synthesis Report
Sudan Post-Conflict Environmental Assessment’ (2007) <http://
postconflict.unep.ch/publications/UNEP_Sudan_synthesis_E.pdf>
accessed 17 August 2017.
11 ‘Darfur conflict heralds era of wars triggered by climate change,
UN report warns’ The Guardian (23 June 2017).
12 Collin Douglas, ‘A Storm Without Rain: Yemen, Water, Climate
Change, and Conflict’ (Center for Climate & Security, 3 August
2016) <https://climateandsecurity.org/2016/08/03/a-storm
-without-rain-yemen-water-climate-change-and-conflict/> ac-
cessed 17 August 2017.
13 ‘Climate change increases the risk of war, scientists prove’ The
Independent (25 July 2016).
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a conflict. A brief overview of tensions and violence
over the past decade, from Syria to Yemen and be-
yond, confirms climate change as a threat multipli-
er. Notwithstanding these developments that seem
to align climate change with security, the role of the
UNSC and the response it can take to deal with cli-
mate change is still unclear.14 It is hence necessary
to better understand whether the securitisation of
the climate discourse has opened up new legal op-
portunities or raised new legal challenges outside of
the UNSC. I will briefly touch upon three of these le-
gal questions: international litigation, climate
refugees, and loss and damage.
Firstly, international litigation on climate change
and litigation has always been linked to SIDS mak-
ing usually an emotional case around a potential cli-
mate change.15 In 2011, Palau considered strategies
leading to a request for an advisory opinion from the
International Court of Justice.16 While there is evi-
dence that climate change is leading to negative ef-
fects that may cause (in the worst case scenarios) the
disappearance of SIDS, it is much more difficult to
developasolid legal argumentcapableofdealingwith
thehurdles of causationand state responsibility. Iron-
ically, the adoption of the Paris Agreement, hailed by
many as a major (positive) milestone in internation-
al climate law, may make it even more difficult for
SIDS and any other interested States to bring a case
before an international court due to the programmat-
ic and non-enforceable nature of the provisions laid
in the Paris Agreement.17 Framing climate change as
a security issue does not really aid in terms of inter-
national climate change litigation. However, it does
amplify the stakes and opens up policy space due to
the high-level nature of security debates globally.
Secondly, the greater the link between climate
change and conflict and security, the stronger the call
to look afresh to the legal definition of refugees in
order for it to include climate refugees.18 In 2015, this
issues left the pages of academic commentary and
landed on mainstream media after a national from
Kiribati, who claimed asylum on climate change
grounds, was sent back home from New Zealand.19
Despite climate change becoming more real in SIDS
and other fragile developing countries, it will be dif-
ficult for courts in any country to grant refugee sta-
tus without official international legal recognition of
climate refugees.Until then, people leaving countries
prone to climate change negative effects may be eas-
ily assimilated to economic migrants and not be
granted asylum. A different scenario may present it-
self if the country is not only prone to negative cli-
mate change effects, but has been hit by a climate
change relatednatural disaster,whichmayhave even
increased tensions within that country. The lines be-
tween economic migrant and climate refugee may
well be blurred in such a scenario partly due to the
securitisation of the climate discourse.
Thirdly, and verymuch linked to those caseswhen
a country suffers sudden damages and great losses
because of climate change, is the debate around the
concept andnowprovisionof ‘loss anddamage’with-
in the international climate change legal regime.20 It
could be speculated that one of the results of fram-
ing climate change (also) as a security issue in this
past ten years has been the inclusion of a stand-alone
provision in the Paris Agreement on loss and dam-
age.21Having said that, the provision and its current
implementation and follow up is probably a watered
downversion fromthat advocatedby thosewhowere
hoping to develop a legalmechanisms capable of pro-
vidingdirectmonetarycompensation for the loss and
damages caused by climate change through a fund
paid into by the greatest world polluters. Loss and
damage is, instead, very much a clearing house of
good practices related to ‘adequate risk assessments
and riskmanagement strategies by governments and
the United Nations’.22 I deliberately use the wording
14 See Shirley Scott, ‘Implications of climate change for the UN
Security Council: mapping the range of potential policy respons-
es’ (2015) 91(6) International Affairs 1317-1333 and Shirley Scott
and Charlotte Ku, Climate Change and the UN Security Council
(Edward Elgar Publishing, forthcoming).
15 Michael Gerrard and Gregory Wannier, Threatened Island Na-
tions: Legal Implications of Rising Seas and a Changing Climate
(Cambridge University Press 2013).
16 Palau seeks UN World Court opinion on damage caused by
greenhouse gases, 22 September 2011, UN News Centre <http://
www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=39710&Cr
=pacific+island&Cr1=#.WYjh4oTyvIU> accessed 17 August
2017.
17 At a domestic level things are very different, with the Paris Agree-
ment paving the grounds for potentially much more climate
change litigation.
18 Frank Biermann and Ingrid Boas, ‘Preparing for a warmer world:
Towards a global governance system to protect climate refugees’
(2010) 10(1) Global Environmental Politics 60–88.
19 ‘Kiribati climate change refugee told he must leave New Zealand’
The Guardian (22 September 2015) <https://www.theguardian
.com/environment/2015/sep/22/kiribati-climate-change-refugee
-told-he-must-leave-new-zealand> accessed 17 August 2017.
20 Meinhard Doelle, ‘The Birth of the Warsaw Loss & Damage
Mechanism’ (2014) 8(1) Carbon and Climate Law Review 35-45.
21 Paris Agreement, art 8.
22 UNSC Resolution 2349 (2017) (n 9) para 26.
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of theMarch 2017UNSC on the Lake Chad to empha-
sise a possible area of collaboration between the
UNSC itself and the international climate change le-
gal regime.
In sum, while the securitisation of the climate dis-
course may have sparked greater attention to possi-
ble cases of international litigation and to debates
over widening the definition of refuges to climate
refugees, the extent towhich framing climate change
as a security issue has been able to provide clarity to
the legal questions underpinning climate change and
litigation and climate change refugees is highly de-
batable. On the other hand, collaboration between
the UNSC and the international climate change legal
regime in the field of loss and damage seems more
promising.
In conclusion, the last decade has shown an in-
creased level of activity within the UNSC in the field
of climate change. The linkage between climate
change and security has been enshrined in a March
2017 UNSC resolution on the Lake Chad. Further-
more, global geo-political tensions can be indirectly
linked to negative effects of climate change, especial-
ly in countries and regions that were already prone
to conflict. Against this background, the role of the
UNSC in dealing with climate change is still unclear
and an area where more work is needed. The collab-
oration between the UNSC and the international cli-
mate change legal regime in the field of loss anddam-
age could be one way of moving forward. Ongoing
negotiations aimed at further operationalising the
provision on loss and damage should be shared with
the UNSC. At the same time, at the next meeting of
the UNSC on climate change loss and damage, ex-
perts should be invited to explore how the UNSC can
contribute positively to identifying and promoting
‘adequate risk assessments and risk management
strategies by governments and the United Nations’.
More research and more work on the ground paving
the way for this potentially fruitful collaboration
should be undertaken before the next UNSC debate
on climate change. While we cannot be sure of the
results of such collaboration, what we can be sure of
is that CCLR will be there, as it has been in the past
ten years, tomonitor and analyse the relationship be-
tween climate change and security.
